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1. Introduction 
Personnel economics has grown over the past twenty years to become a major branch of labour 
economics. Although much has been learned, many important questions remain. For example, are 
worker wage profiles dependent on individual attributes or is the firm more important in determining 
wage growth. [Lazear (2000), p.611]. 
 
A firm has a number of weapons in its arsenal that it can use to raise worker productivity. It 
can establish a tournament competition in which a rank-order prize structure awards the 
largest prize to the most productive worker, the second-largest prize to the second-most 
productive worker, and so on [Lazear and Rosen (1981). It can implement contingent 
employment contracts in which wages are an increasing function of output, thereby educing 
effort as workers strive to maximize realized earnings net of effort [Mirrlees (1976), 
Holmstrom (1979)]. Or it can adopt a carrot and stick, efficiency-wage approach; paying a 
single wage that is independent of output but above the market clearing level, and dismissing 
any worker it detects as providing inadequate performance [Shapiro and Stiglitz (1985)].1 
Another line of attack available to the firm is to tilt the remuneration package over 
time, paying workers less than the value of their marginal product when they are relatively 
short-tenured, and correspondingly more than the value of their marginal product when they 
are relatively long-tenured. Deferring compensation in this way imputes workers with ex post 
rents that they will be reluctant to jeopardise. If reducing effort increases the probability of 
involuntary termination, then upward sloping wage profiles raise the cost of shirking and 
encourage workers to raise effort.  
A firm will therefore face optimal trade-offs between both the level and rate of change 
of remuneration and the quantity of resources it devotes to monitoring. The former trade-off, 
between the level of remuneration and monitoring, has been examined extensively in the 
                                                 
1 The Shapiro-Stiglitz model regards worker effort as synonymous with productivity. This need not be the case. 
Other conduits through which efficiency wages might impact upon productivity include reduced turnover [Salop 
(1979), Stiglitz (1985)], adverse selection [Weiss (1980)] and worker morale [Akerlof (1982)].  
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literature. In this paper, however, we undertake the first empirical investigation of the latter 
trade-off; the relationship between the slope of the wage-tenure profile and the level of 
monitoring. On the assumption that firms strive for the optimal trade-off between these 
various instruments, we hypothesise that increased monitoring leads to a decline in the slope 
of the wage-tenure profile. Our empirical analysis, using two cross sections of matched 
employer-employee British data, provides robust support for this prediction. 
The paper is set out as follows: Section 2 discusses the wage-seniority nexus; Section 
3 outlines our theoretical underpinning whilst Section 4 discusses our data and methodology, 
Section 5 sets our preliminary analysis and Section 6 presents a number of robustness checks. 
The relationship between wages profiles and firm size is addressed in Section 7. And some 
final comments are collected in Section 8. 
2.  The Wage-Seniority Nexus 
Efficiency wage theory predicts that firms can elicit effort from their employees by paying 
supra-competitive (i.e. efficiency) wages and / or by devoting resources to monitoring. Jobs 
in which it is difficult to monitor worker performance will generally merit high pay, and vice 
versa. This trade-off between the level of remuneration and monitoring - a central tenet of 
Bulow and Summer’s (1986) dual labour market hypothesis - has been examined extensively 
in the empirical literature. Supportive evidence (among others) is offered by Cappelli and 
Chauvin (1991), Ewing and Payne (1999), Groshen and Krueger (1990), Konings and Walsh 
(1994), Krueger (1991), Kruse (1992), Machin and Manning (1992), Moretti and Perloff 
(2002), Raff and Summers (1987), Rebitzer (1995) and Vroman (1990). Less sympathetic 
conclusions are drawn by Neal (1993), Fitzroy and Kraft (1986) and Brunello (1995).2 
                                                 
2 Recent theoretical work has questioned the notion that monitoring and pay are generally substitutable. Allgulin 
and Ellingsen (2002) argue that whilst lower monitoring costs induce a cut in the efficient wage, as firms 
substitute towards monitoring, this is only the case for a given level of effort. In such circumstances firms will 
typically find it optimal to demand a higher level of effort from their workforce, and the impact of this on the 
5 
Another option available to the firm is to tilt the remuneration package over time such 
that pay increases with seniority. The correlation between seniority and pay is one of the 
most robust empirical findings in labour economics - for surveys of the theoretical and the 
empirical literature, see Carmichael (1989), Hutchens (1989), Polachek and Siebert (1992), 
and Lazear (2000). Conventional wisdom throughout most of the 1960s and 1970s as to the 
reason for the relationship was that earnings reflected the acquisition of, and reward to, 
human capital. Workers became more productive, and hence better remunerated, over time 
because of investments in training. Such investments could be either specific or general; the 
former increased a worker’s productivity in the worker’s current firm, whilst the latter 
increased a worker’s productivity both in the worker’s current firm and in any future firm. 
Worker’s paid for general training, and subsidised specific training, by accepting early career 
(i.e. training) wages below the value of their marginal product to the firm. Latter career (i.e. 
trained) wages reflected the increase in worker productivity; fully in the case of general 
training and partially in the case of specific training. Since specific training is only of value 
within a worker’s current firm, it is optimal for workers to neither pay the full cost nor reap 
the full benefit of such training - to do otherwise might tempt the firm into making 
redundancies in an attempt to replace trained with untrained workers. By paying a trained 
wage at a rate below the value of a trained workers’ marginal product, firms are dissuaded 
from laying-off trained workers and, accordingly, workers are persuaded to participate in 
specific training programs. In either case an upward sloping wage profile emerges; wages 
increase with seniority because productivity increase with seniority [Mincer (1958), Becker 
(1962), Ben-Porath (1967)]. 
The human capital explanation was challenged in a series of papers by Lazear (1979, 
1981, 1983) and Medoff and Abraham (1980, 1981). Lazear observed that mandatory 
                                                                                                                                                       
level of pay is ambiguous. 
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retirement and actuarially unfair pension schemes that encourage early retirement were 
incompatible with human capital theory. Why would firms establish human resource policies 
whereby an employee was paid, and thus evidently valued, today but then either forced or 
induced to quit tomorrow? Such policies contradict the human capital thesis that senior 
workers are paid no more than their marginal product, particularly when wages can be 
adjusted downwards if productivity declines with age. 
Medoff and Abraham (1980, 1981) highlighted a related conundrum in their analysis 
of data on pay and supervisor performance ratings. They found that although relative 
performance ratings within a particular job grade did not increase with experience in the job 
grade, relative pay did. Again, such a finding is incompatible with the human capital position 
that earnings increase with seniority because productivity increases with seniority. 
Several models of wage setting are able to explain the apparent failings of the human 
capital model. Freeman (1977) and Harris and Holmstrom (1982) develop models in which 
risk averse workers prefer upward sloping wage profiles because they offer insurance against 
the possibility that the workers’ future productivity is lower than anticipated. Another 
possibility is that workers prefer rising consumption profiles over their life cycle but find 
voluntary saving difficult. Upward sloping earnings profiles are therefore desirable because 
they represent a mechanism for forced-saving [Loewenstein and Sicherman (1991), Frank 
and Hutchens (1993), Neumark (1995)]. And models of job search generally predict that 
more time in the labor market increases the chance of finding a better match and thus tends to 
be associated with higher earnings [Ruhm (1991), Jacobson and LaLonde (1993), Manning 
(2000)].  
Perhaps the most persuasive explanation is the agency approach developed by Lazear 
(1979, 1981, 1983). Lazear reconciled the various phenomena by focussing on contracts that 
discourage employee shirking and other malfeasance over an employee’s life cycle, 
7 
especially in situations where monitoring worker effort is problematic. The basic idea is that 
workers and firms enter into contracts, implicit or explicit, whereby workers are paid less 
than the value of their marginal product when they are in the early years of their job tenure, 
and correspondingly more than the value of their marginal product when they are in their 
latter years. By deferring compensation in this way, workers are provided with ex post rents 
that they are reluctant to lose. If reducing effort increases the probability of involuntary 
termination, then upward sloping wage profiles raise the cost of shirking and encourage 
workers to raise effort.  
Lazear’s explanation cuts the link between productivity and pay; wages grow with 
seniority irrespective of how product relates to seniority. And whilst it makes sense for the 
firm to pay wages in excess of the value of a worker’s marginal product for a period of time, 
it would not make sense for the firm to do this indefinitely. There will come a point when the 
present discounted value of the worker’s marginal product equals the present discounted 
value of his remuneration package. This would imply, from the firm’s perspective, an optimal 
retirement date and hence the need for policies to force or encourage the worker’s retirement. 
 The question as to whether it is human capital or agency considerations that drive the 
wage profile is not entirely academic. If human capital explanations are found wanting and 
agency considerations dominate, then issues arise concerning the credibility of long-term 
employment contracts. Firms will want to lose senior workers who are more expensive but 
perhaps not more productive. This could lead to time-consistency problems, with some firms 
finding it difficult to attract younger applicants because of their inability to guarantee long-
term employment. If, on the other hand, the slope is primarily a reflection of human capital 
considerations, then such incentive-compatibility problems will not arise - older workers will 
8 
be more productive ceteris paribus. In this case, the wage profile provides some indication of 
the return to investments in on-the-job training and education.3 
Several studies have attempted to discriminate empirically between the two 
explanations. Hutchens (1987) focuses on the implicit trade off between the use of deferred 
payment contracts and the difficulty of monitoring and finds that Lazear-type characteristics 
(i.e. wage profiles, mandatory retirement, pension schemes, long job tenures) tend not to be 
associated with jobs that are conducive to monitoring.  
Lazear and Moore (1984) address the issue by considering the empirical evidence 
regarding the relative ‘flatness’ of self-employed workers’ wage profiles [Wolpin (1977), 
Fuchs (1981)]. Such a finding is puzzling since investments in physical capital would tend to 
depress observed wages for the early career self-employed, whilst subsequent returns to those 
investments would tend to raise observed wages. Both factors imply that, other things equal, 
the wage profiles of self-employed workers will be steeper than those of wage and salary 
workers.  
Lazear and Moore (1984) rationalize the finding by highlighting the duality of 
principal and ownership intrinsic to self-employment. Observed wage profiles, they argue, 
are a reflection of the disharmony of interests prevalent in the employment relation that are, 
by definition, absent from self-employment. By raising the wage profile, employers are able 
to induce their employees to work harder, therefore raising the present value of the latter’s 
lifetime earnings. The self-employed require no such internal incentive mechanism and thus 
may be used as a control group to test the theoretical prior that the profile is determined 
primarily by agency as opposed to human capital considerations. 
Brown and Sessions (2006) generalise Lazear and Moore’s approach by comparing 
the wage profiles of self-employed workers, wage and salary workers, and workers employed 
                                                 
3 The profile may also affect quitting behavior. More experienced ‘generally’ trained workers will have more 
flexibility in the labor market than ‘specifically’ trained workers. But both types may have more options than 
senior workers whose rents primarily reflect agency considerations. 
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under performance related pay schemes. The latter, they argue, face an intermediate degree of 
agency consideration as compared to the two former, and if agency considerations are 
important then their profile should lay between those of self-employed workers and wage and 
salary workers. Both studies find convincing empirical support – Lazear and Moore from 
U.S. data, Brown and Sessions from British data - for the argument that agency 
considerations are extremely important in driving the profile. 
In what follows we provide a further test of Lazear’s arguments by focussing on the 
relationship between the slope of the earnings profile and the resources the firm devotes to 
monitoring. Setting out a simple, two-period model of efficiency wages that abstracts from 
considerations of human capital, we illustrate the relationship between monitoring and the 
wage-tenure profile. Our exposition suggests that there is a trade-off between current period 
monitoring and the slope of the profile, which we then test empirically using two cross 
sections of British matched employer-employee data. This is the first formal empirical 
investigation into what remains one of the key issues in labour economics. Our results 
provide robust support for the hypothesis that firms trade-off the quantity of resources they 
devote to monitoring against the slope of the wage profile. 
In using matched employer-employee data we also contribute to the fast growing 
literature that is used matched employer employee data to obtain a better understanding of the 
workings of the labour market [Arai (2003), Barth (1997), Hellerstein and Neumark (1995), 
Hellerstein et al. (1999)].  
3. Theoretical Underpinning 
Assume for ease of analytical exposition that workers are homogenous risk neutral with a 
working life of two periods and separable periodic utility functions ut = mt − et , t = 1, 2, 
where  mt  and  et  denote income and effort respectively in period t. Assume further that 
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employed workers make a discrete, all or nothing choice regarding the provision of effort to 
their employer such that 
 
et = 0,e( ), where e > 0 . Firms have access to some monitoring 
technology defined through the function p k( ), where k denotes the value of resources 
devoted to monitoring and 
 
p k( )∈ 0,1⎡⎣ ⎤⎦  the probability that a shirker (i.e. a worker setting 
 et = 0 ) will be detected. To avoid unnecessary complications, we assume that the criteria on 
which this judgement is based are verifiable by an independent arbitrator such that there is no 
dispute about the firm’s assessment. We assume that monitoring technology is such that 
 
dp k( ) dk ≡ ′p k( )> 0 ,  d 2 p k( ) dk 2 ≡ ′′p k( )< 0 , p 0( )= 0  and  p %k( )= 1. It is thus 
technically possible for the firm to perfectly monitor worker performance. Since our focus of 
interest is not the optimal level of monitoring, we assume that production and monitoring 
technologies are such that it is always in the interests of the firm to monitor imperfectly. 
Detection implies instantaneous dismissal and unemployment utility b.  
There are two types of firms. One type of firm is able to obtain revenue from a worker 
in a single period via the function: y = f e( ), where f 0( )= 0  and  f e( )= y < %k . These firms 
offer single-period, ‘spot-market’ employment contracts of the form w,e( ). The other type of 
firms requires two periods of effort input from workers to produce revenue via the function: 
y = g e1,e2( ), where  g e,e( )= 1+ β( )y < %k , β > 1 , and g e ,0( )= g 0,e( )= g 0,0( )= 0 . These 
firms offer ‘life-time’ employment contracts of the form w1,w2 ,e ,e( ) and are obliged to set 
their monitoring intensity for two periods. One could envisage these firms as requiring a 
period of training on the part of the worker before any output is produced. 
A ‘spot’ firm’s problem is to maximize its profits subject to the constraints that 
workers receive at least their reservation wage, wr = e + b , and that, once employed, they do 
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not shirk. A ‘spot-market’ employment contract will therefore necessitate workers being paid 
the lowest wage that satisfies the single period ‘non-shirking constraint’ (NSC): 
 
w− e ≥ p k( )b+ 1− p k( )⎡⎣ ⎤⎦w  (1) 
Satisfaction of (1) implies an optimal (vis. ‘efficiency’) wage of w∗ k( )= b + e p k( )> wr , 
such that workers receive some employment rents but are just indifferent between shirking 
and not shirking.  
Consider now the specification of a two-period ‘lifetime’ contract. In the second 
period of such a contract, firms offering such contracts will be faced with the same effort 
elicitation problem as those firms offering spot contracts such that 
 w2
∗ k( )= w∗ k( )= b + e p k( ) as before. In the first period, however, the firm can set  w1  such 
that the worker’s lifetime NSC is satisfied: 
 
w1 + w2∗ − 2e ≥ p k( )2b+ 1− p k( )⎡⎣ ⎤⎦ w1 + w2∗ − e( ) (2) 
Undetected shirkers enjoy utility of w1  now and w2
∗ − e  tomorrow - i.e. given  w2∗ , workers 
will not shirk in period two. Note the assumption that detected shirkers are fired and forced 
into permanent unemployment. This is an expository device. Allowing a more realistic 
scenario whereby detected shirkers receive unemployment benefits in period one and then 
have a chance of obtaining a (single period) employment contract in period two would not 
change our qualitative results. Satisfaction of (2) implies an equilibrium first period wage of 
 w1
∗ = b + e , with workers acquiring rents on account of the firm’s inability to perfectly 
monitor. The firm, however, can reduce these rents by offering lifetime contracts that induce 
workers to queue up to access the second period wage that exceeds their reservation utility. 
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Since it is in the firm’s interest to pay neither more nor less than the efficient wages 
levels w∗ = w1∗,w2∗( ) derived from the two non-shirking constraints, we can substitute them 
directly into the firm’s profit function: 
π w∗,k( )= βy − w1∗ + w2∗ + c k( )⎡⎣ ⎤⎦
⇒
π∗ k( )= βy − 2b + 1+ p k( )
p k( )
⎡
⎣⎢
⎤
⎦⎥
e + c k( )⎧⎨⎪⎩⎪
⎫⎬⎪⎭⎪
 (3) 
Although the firm is obliged, if it wishes to produce revenue, to pay workers their efficient 
wages, it can reduce these efficient wages by increasing the resources it devotes to 
monitoring. The firm will thus optimise profit with respect to k by equating the marginal 
benefit and marginal cost of increasing the quantity of resources devoted to monitoring: 
∂π∗ k( )
∂k =
′p k∗( )
p k∗( )⎡⎣ ⎤⎦2 e − ′c k
∗( )= 0  (4) 
Workers employed under lifetime contracts thus face an upward sloping earnings profile: 
 
Δw∗ k∗( )= w2∗ k∗( )− w1∗ = 1− p k∗( )p k∗( )
⎡
⎣
⎢⎢
⎤
⎦
⎥⎥e > 0  (5) 
It is apparent from equation (5) that increased monitoring on the part of the firm assuages the 
slope of the experience-earnings profile: 
 
∂Δw k∗( )
∂k∗ = −
′p k∗( )
p k∗( )⎡⎣ ⎤⎦2 e < 0  (6) 
The above illustration is, clearly, highly simplified. Complications to the basic story could, 
for example, involve risk-averseness on the part of the worker. In such a situation, workers 
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would prefer relatively flatter profiles, other things equal, especially if it is possible for the 
firm to make a type-2 error and inadvertently fire a non-shirker, if there is a chance that the 
firm will default on its promise of future high wages, or if the firm’s survival in future 
periods is not guaranteed. Such risk would be especially pronounced in relatively smaller 
firms that, other things equal, will be more likely to go out of business and whose promise of 
future wage premia will be, consequently, less credible. 
There is also the assumption that the choice over effort is dichotomous. In more 
general, continuous effort settings, the relationship between the level of pay and monitoring 
is less clear-cut. Essentially, changes in the cost of monitoring will invoke both substitution 
and scale effects. An increase in the cost of monitoring will induce firms to place a greater 
reliance on wage incentives, but it may also lead to a reduction in the desired level of effort 
itself, and this latter effect may conceivably outweigh the former [Rebitzer (1995), Walsh 
(1999), Goerke (2001), Allgulin and Elllingson (2002)]. Empirical analysis of this issue 
suggests that supervision has a significant and negative impact on the wages of high-effort 
workers, but not on the wages of low-effort workers [Strobl and Walsh (2007)]. 
The relationship between monitoring and the experience-earnings profile under 
continuous effort is, to our knowledge, still to be investigated. A trade-off between the level 
of monitoring and the slope of the earnings profile has been found in more complex 
dichotomous effort models – see, for example, Lazear (1981), Arvan (1989) and Bai (1997). 
Finally, firms evidently do not restrict themselves to simple ‘detect and fire’ 
technologies but often employ more sophisticated incentive schemes such as performance 
related pay, career tournaments, profit sharing and employee share-ownership. Although we 
do not investigate such considerations here, we do control for a number of workplace 
incentive schemes in our empirical analysis. 
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4. Data and Methodology 
4.1 Data 
Our data are derived from the 1998 and 2004 Workplace Employee Relations Survey (WERS). 
These are the fourth and fifth instalments of a Government funded series of cross-section 
surveys conducted at British workplaces. The previous surveys were conducted in 1980, 1984 
and 1990. 
 The sample of workplaces was randomly drawn from the Interdepartmental Business 
Register (IDBR). This is maintained by the Office for National Statistics (ONS) and is 
considered to be the highest quality-sampling frame of workplaces available in the United 
Kingdom. The sample is stratified by workplace size and industry and larger workplaces and 
some industries are over represented [see Chaplin et al. (2005)]. A workplace is defined as 
the activities of a single employer at a single set of premises.  
 The survey comprises three main sections: The ‘Management Questionnaire’ (face-to-
face interviews with senior managers with day-to-day responsibility for employee relations); 
the ‘Worker Representative Questionnaire’; and the ‘Employee Questionnaire’. The survey 
population for the Management Questionnaire is all British workplaces barring those in 
agriculture, hunting and forestry, fishing, mining and quarrying, private households with 
employed persons, and extra-territorial organisations. 4 
 The response rate in the 1998 (2004) Management Questionnaire was 80% (64%). 
The respective figure for the Employee Questionnaire was 66% (61%) –  see Airey et al. 
(1999) and Kersley et al. (2006) for discussions as to why the response rates differ. At those 
workplaces responding to the manager survey, a questionnaire was presented to 25 randomly 
                                                 
4 There is a panel element to WERS, but it only provides information on a subset of establishment 
characteristics, not on employees.  
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selected employees in workplaces with more than 25 employees, or to all the employees in 
workplaces with fewer than 25 employees. 
 Changes in the nature of interest in employment relations led to substantial redesign 
of the 2004 wave. A major modification was the incorporation of small workplaces (i.e. those 
employing between 5 and 9 employees). There were also a number of changes to the format 
of the various survey questions [see Kersley et al. (2006)].  
 For the purposes of our study, we combine the data from the Management and 
Employee Questionnaires. Thus, our 1998 (2004) sample comprises 19847 (16773) 
employees linked to a set of 1762 (1705) establishments. Due to the stratified nature of the 
survey, we weight our estimates using establishment level weights so that our estimates are 
representative of the sampling population. 
4.2 Methodology 
Our equation of interest is: 
 
wij = α + β0tij + β1tij2 + β2mj + β3 tij ⋅mj( )+ β4Χ ij + uij  (7) 
where  i = 1,..., M  and  j = 1,..., N  denote individual worker and firm-specific subscripts 
respectively. The dependent variable, wij , denotes the log weekly wage earned by individual 
i at firm j,  tij
denotes the employment tenure of individual i at firm j, mj  denotes the level of 
monitoring within firm j,  Χ ij denotes a vector of individual regressors and  uij denotes the 
error term. 
Earnings are recorded as a categorical variable in WERS. The specific question in 
both surveys is:  
How much do you get paid for your job here, before tax and other deductions are 
taken out? If your pay changes before tax from week to week because of overtime, or 
because you work different hours each week, think of what you earn on average.  
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Respondents in the 1998 survey were asked to place their weekly pay level within 12 bands, 
chosen to approximate decile bands and the top and bottom 5% of the earnings distribution as 
estimated from the 1996 New Earnings Survey. The available bands were: less than £50, £51-
£80, £81-£140, £141-£180, £181-£220, £221-£260, £261-£310, £311-£360, £361-£430, 
£431-£540, £541-£680, £681 or more. The number of bands was increased to 14 in 2004: less 
than £50, £51-£80, £81-£110, £111-£140, £141-£180, £181-£220, £221-£260, £261-£310, 
£311-£360, £361-£430, £431-£540, £541-£680, £681-£870, £871 or more. Given the 
categorical nature of the wage variable, we estimate equation (7) via an interval regression 
model. We construct lower and upper bounds of wages by taking the midpoints of each band 
and then aggregating. 
We proxy monitoring intensity via the proportion of supervisory employees within the 
firm. A similar approach has been adopted by a number of researchers, for example Leonard 
(1987), Gordon (1990, 1994) and Neal (1993). Such an approach is not, however, 
uncontentious. Drago and Perlman (1989) support the use of supervision as a proxy for 
monitoring, although they acknowledge that supervision may occur for non-monitoring 
purposes - for example, to co-ordinate production. Indeed, monitoring may not entail direct 
supervision but may instead rely on factors such as output measurement and piece rates. 
More problematic, the number of supervisors might be high because monitoring is difficult 
[Allgulin and Ellingsen (2002)] and supervisors may spend only a fraction of work time 
monitoring [Rebitzer (1995)]. Despite these problems, our data compel us to rely on the 
proxy defined above.  
Supervisors, which include foremen and line managers, are defined in the WERS as 
‘… those people directly concerned with the detailed supervision of work’. The specific 
variable (Monitoring) is derived from the following question asked in both the 1998 and 2004 
‘Management Questionnaire’:  
17 
What proportion of non-managerial employees here have job duties that involve 
supervising other employees? (BINVMANG). 
Managers were asked to indicate in which range their firm lay: 0% (‘None’), 1 – 19% (‘Just a 
few’), 20 – 39% (‘Some’), 40 – 59% (‘Around half’), 60 – 79% (‘Most’), 80 - 99% (‘Almost 
all’) and 100% (All). From this information, we constructed a 7-point supervision index 
(‘Monitoring’) where 6 (0) represents the highest (lowest) level of monitoring. The 
distribution of the index across the sample of firms in 1998 (2004) is as follows: 0 [223 (319) 
firms], 1 [1,009 (967) firms], 2 [600 (680) firms], 3 [166 (197) firms], [85 (73) firms], 5 [47 
(28) firms], and 6 [51 (16) firms].5 Full variable definitions and summary statistics for the 
explanatory variables are detailed in Tables 1-4 (Appendix). 
Given that firms set wages and monitoring jointly as part of their profit-maximising 
strategy, we instrument monitoring by estimating a fitted version of equation (7): 
( )20 1 2 3 4ˆ ˆij ij ij j ij j ij ijw t t m t mα β β β β β ε= + + + + ⋅ + Χ +  (8) 
5ˆ j j jm β δ= Θ +  (9) 
ˆ jm  denotes the ‘fitted’ level of monitoring within firm j and Θ j  is a vector of explanatory 
variables that influence this level of monitoring. We experimented with a number of firm-
specific explanatory variables in estimating equation (9). Our results were robust to this 
experimentation and our preferred specification is set out in Table 5 (Appendix). 
We test for the exogeneity of the endogenous variable (Monitoring) in equation (8) 
using the weak test of erogeneity proposed by Smith and Blundell (1986). As suggested by 
Gourieroux et al. (1987), we calculate the generalised residuals from the first-stage ordered 
probit regression equation (9), and then insert these into the second-stage interval regression 
                                                 
5 There is clearly an issue as to managers reporting that either ‘all’ or ‘none’ of their non-managerial employees 
were involved in supervision. The former firms might be worker-owned cooperatives of some form whilst the 
latter could be employing some other means of monitoring worker performance. For an excellent discussion 
between different types of firms and monitoring see Alchian and Demsetz (1972). 
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equation (8). For both the 1998 and 2004 samples, we are unable to reject the null hypothesis 
that the generalised residuals have no explanatory variable.6 
Because we predict monitoring from an ordered probit model (non-linear model) and 
then interact the predicted value of monitoring with tenure, we test the statistical significance 
of the interaction variable (Fitted Monitoring*Tenure) using the following procedure (see 
Cameron and Trivedi, 2005): For each sample, we first draw a bootstrap resample of size 
equal to the original sample size with replacement and compute the parameter of the 
interaction variable. We then simulate this procedure using 1000 replications. For both the 
1998 and 2004 samples, we are able to reject the null hypothesis that the interaction variable 
is equal to zero at the 5 percent level. The p-value of the interaction variable in the 1998 
sample is equal to 0.035 and in the 2004 sample is equal to 0.019. 
5. Results 
Our preliminary regression results are set out in Table 6 (Appendix).7 The regressions for 
both samples are well specified and the estimated coefficients are consistent with the standard 
human capital model of wages. Wages increase concavely with job tenure and are positively 
and significantly related to educational attainment and the amount of training undertaken in 
the previous twelve months. We also note significant occupational differentials and evidence 
of racial and gender bias. There are significant and positive returns to trade union 
membership whilst fixed-term and temporary employees receive lower wages than their full-
time counterparts, other things equal. In terms of firm characteristics, pay is higher in larger 
                                                 
6 For 1998, the coefficient of the generalized residual is -0.004 (t-test = -0.10) whilst for 2004, the coefficient of 
the generalized residual is -0.042 (t-test = -0.80). Graphical representations of the generalized residuals using a 
kernel density show that they follow a normal distribution.    
7 Our results for 2004 are based on a sample of all workplaces surveyed. Restricting the sample to 
establishments with more than 10 employees, in order to render the sample comparable with the 1998 sample, 
does not affect our results. These results are available on request.  
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firms but lower in firms the more skewed the age demographic and in firms with a higher 
percentage of part-time employees.  
In terms of our key regressor, it is evident that higher fitted monitoring (Fitted 
Monitoring) impacts negatively on the slope of the wage profile in both samples. In 1998, a 
unit increase in Fitted Monitoring reduces the slope of the wage profile by 0.8 percent for 
each year of tenure, whilst in 2004, a unit increase in Fitted Monitoring reduces the slope of 
the profile by 1.0 per cent for each year of tenure. Increased monitoring, therefore, not only 
reduces the slope of the wage tenure profile, but it does so more for employees with longer 
tenure. 
 The effect of monitoring on the shape of the wage-tenure profile is illustrated 
graphically in Figure 1 for our 1998 sample and in Figure 2 for our 2004 sample. In Figure 1, 
we simulate four wage-tenure profiles representing four values of our ‘fitted’ monitoring 
variable (i.e. Fitted Monitoring = 0, Fitted Monitoring = 1, Fitted Monitoring = 1.5 and 
Fitted Monitoring = 2.0). These values are within the range of Fitted Monitoring for 1998. In 
Figure 2, we undertake a similar exercise, with the four Fitted Monitoring values equal now 
to 0, 0.2, 0.4 and 0.6 respectively. Again, these values are within the range of Fitted 
Monitoring for 2004. For ease of graphical exposition, we set the constants in both graphs 
equal to zero.  
   It is clear from Figure 1 and Figure 2 that even when we control directly for human 
capital and demographic variables, and indirectly for a battery of firm-specific variables, 
there is a significant and consistent negative relationship between monitoring and the slope of 
the wage profile. In Figure 1, wages peak at 14.2 years of tenure when Fitted Monitoring = 0. 
When Fitted Monitoring = 1, the peak occurs at 11.9 years, falling to 10.8 years and 8.3 years 
as Fitted Monitoring = 1.5 and Fitted Monitoring = 2 respectively. In Figure 2, wages peak at 
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13.7, 12.7, 11.8 and 10.8 years of tenure as Fitted Monitoring = 0.0, 0.2, 0.4 and 0.6 
respectively.  
Our results also exhibit an insignificant relationship between the level of monitoring 
(i.e. Fitted Monitoring) and LnWage in both 1998 and 2004. To investigate this further, we 
first set out in Table 7 (Appendix) cross tabulations between the natural logarithm of wages 
and our ‘raw’ monitoring variables (i.e. Monitoring 0 - Monitoring 6). It is apparent from 
comparing the first and the last rows of the table, that at the highest level of monitoring the 
mean value of the log wage is lower than it is when there is no monitoring. Such a result is 
consistent with a relationship in which workplaces that pay lower wages have higher levels of 
monitoring.   
-0.05
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
0.3
0.35
0.4
1 3 5 7 9 11 13 15 17 19 21
Years of Tenure
Lo
g 
W
ag
e No Monitoring
Low  Monitoring
Intermediate Monitoring
High Monitoring
 
Figure 1: Wages, Monitoring and Tenure - 1998 
Note: Low, Intermediate and High Monitoring are defined as when Fitted Monitoring is equal to 
1.0, 1.5 and 2.0 respectively. These values are within the range of Fitted Monitoring for 1998. 
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Figure 2: Wages, Monitoring and Tenure - 2004 
Note: Low, Intermediate and High Monitoring are defined as when Fitted Monitoring is equal to 
0.2, 0.4 and 0.6 respectively. These values are within the range of Fitted Monitoring for 2004. 
We then re-estimated our Table 6 specifications replacing Fitted Monitoring and Fitted 
Monitoring*Tenure with six ‘raw’ monitoring dummy variables derived from the Binvmang 
survey question (i.e. Monitoring 1, Monitoring 2, Monitoring 3, Monitoring 4, Monitoring 5, 
Monitoring 6). Our results are set out in Table 8 and suggest that the quantity of resources 
devoted to monitoring do no affect the level of wages, other things equal; only in 
establishments in 1998 where managers record that ‘around half’ of all non-managerial 
employees have supervisory responsibility, are wages significantly lower than in otherwise 
comparable firms. 
This result accords with the existing, somewhat ambiguous, evidence on the 
relationship between monitoring and wages [Cappelli and Chauvin (1991), Goerke (2001), 
Walsh (1999)]. Increased levels of monitoring have been found to impact both positively and 
negatively on wages, with negative effects being found for high effort workers [Strobl and 
Walsh (2007)].  
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6. Robustness 
To examine the robustness of our findings regarding the relationship between monitoring and 
the earnings profiles, we estimate a series of regressions that incorporate additional regressors 
into our standard specification.   
 Firstly, we endeavour to capture as much unobserved individual heterogeneity in our 
data as possible by including (additively) a battery of demographic and occupational 
variables, as well as controls for alternative measures of workplace incentives that may mask 
the relationship between supervision and tenure. We do this by incorporating a number of 
variables into our standard (i.e. Table 6) interval regression to control for: age (Age1 - Age5); 
dependent children (Dependent Children); working hours (natural logarithm of weekly 
working hours); teamwork (Teamwork2–Teamwork7); performance related pay (PRP1-
PRP5); (iv) training (Training% 1 - Training% 5); (iv) wage bargaining (Wage-Bargain1–
Wage-Bargain5); productivity (Productivity 1–Productivity 6); (iv) pension schemes 
(Pension Scheme); personality and aptitude Tests (Personality  & Aptitude).  We also test for 
robustness with respect to the nature of the workforce by including managers and 
professional employees into our sample and by incorporating the following zero-one dummy 
variables into our standard (i.e. Table 6) interval regressions (Manager & Professional).  
  Our results for 1998 and 2004 are set out in Table 9 and Table 10 respectively. It is 
apparent that our key finding of an inverse relationship between fitted monitoring and the 
slope of the wage profile remains impermeable to the presence of these additional controls.   
All of the robustness checks set out in Tables 9 and 10 take account of within-firm 
heterogeneity. Our results may, however, also reflect between-firm heterogeneity. It may be, 
the case, for example, that those firms which supervise more intensely tend to employ a 
generally older than average workforce, and also that they tend to pay everyone at the 
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establishment a generally below average wage. This would imply a spurious relationship 
between supervision, tenure and pay. We control for such between-firm heterogeneity by re-
estimating in Table 11 our standard (i.e .Table 6) specification using a random effects model. 
It is evident that our estimates are also robust to this alternative specification, which would 
suggest that our results do not reflect any underlying spurious relationship between 
monitoring, tenure and pay. 
We also control for any unobserved heterogeneity that is constant over time and 
correlated with independent variables by estimating a fixed effects model that wipes out 
individual firm characteristics, but which retains our Fitted Monitoring*Tenure interaction 
variable. Our results from this exercise are set out in Table 12, and it would appear that our 
key finding is again robust.  
As a final robustness check we utilise information from the following question which 
is provided in the 2004, but not in the 1998 Employee Questionnaire: 
Do you supervise any other employees? A supervisor, foremen or line manager is responsible 
for overseeing the work of other employees on a day to day basis (yes / no). (e13) 
Our aim here is to test whether our results are robust to an alternative, employee-recorded 
measure of supervision. Given the dichotomous nature the above question, we aggregated 
employees’ responses to by establishment and used the derived variable to predict a ‘fitted’ 
value of monitoring using the same regressors as in Table 6. We then interacted this ‘fitted’ 
measure of monitoring with tenure. Our results from this exercise are set out in Table 13 and 
again emphasise the robustness of our central finding.  
7. Wage Profiles and Firm Size 
According to Lazear (1979), large firms are generally less likely to default on wage contracts, 
are generally less likely to go bankrupt, and are generally more concerned with reputation. In 
contrast, small firms are more likely to go out of business and to renege on promises of future 
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wage rents. We would therefore expect wage profiles observed in larger firms to be steeper 
than those observed in smaller firms. These later, being unable to procure employee effort by 
ostensibly vacuous assurances of higher future wages, should therefore place a heavier 
reliance on employee monitoring than their larger counterparts.  
We empirically test this hypothesis by decomposing our analysis to ‘small’ and 
‘large’ firms. In the 1998 sample, the average size of the firm is 62.6 employees whilst in the 
2004 sample, the average size of the firm is 49.5 employees - see Table 14). In the 1998 
sample, we therefore define ‘small’ firms to be those firms with less than 62.6 employees and 
‘large’ firms to be those firms with at least 62.6 employees. Similarly, in the 2004 sample, we 
define ‘small’ firms to be those firms with less than 49.5 and ‘large’ firms to be those firms 
with at least 49.5 employees.8  
We test Lazear’s prediction by examining the relationship beween log wages, and 
Fitted-Monitoring, log wages and the Fitted-Monitoring*Tenure interaction, and also 
between log wages and a Fitted-Monitoring*Tenure*Log Firm Size triple interaction.9 
Our results are set out in Table 14 and would appear to offer strong support for Lazear 
(1979). We find that small firms are more likely to monitor their employees than large firms. 
Somewhat surprisingly, the interaction between fitted monitoring and tenure is negative and 
significant in both samples only for small firms. The triple interaction term, however, is 
negative and significant in both samples, suggesting that the slope of the wage profile does 
indeed fall as firm size increases.  
 
 
                                                 
8 The average size of the firms in the 2004 sample is smaller than in the 1998 sample, as the 2004 sample 
includes establishments with less than 10 employees (see Section 3).  
9 Note, fitted-monitoring is now our standard BINVMANG derived measure of monitoring. 
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8. Final Comments 
Efficiency wage theory predicts that firms can elicit effort from their employees by paying 
supra-competitive (i.e. efficiency) wages and/or by devoting resources to monitoring. 
Another option available to firms is to tilt the remuneration package over time such that the 
prospect of higher future earnings acts as a deterrent to current period shirking. It follows, 
therefore, that a potential trade-off, and one not hitherto investigated in the literature, is that 
between the level of monitoring and the shape of the wage-tenure profile. 
In what is the first empirical investigation of its kind, we have explored these 
predictions using two cross-section surveys of matched employer-employee British data. Our 
analysis finds robust evidence of an inverse relationship between the level of monitoring and 
the slope of the wage-tenure profile, and may be interpreted as further evidence in support of 
of efficiency wage theory. They also support the Lazear (1979, 1981, 1983) and Medoff and 
Abraham (1980, 1981) view that it is agency rather than human capital considerations that 
drive the wage-tenure profile.  
It would appear from our results that British establishments elicit optimal effort from 
their employees by trading off higher current period monitoring against future wage rents. 
Whether or not firms in other countries replicate this strategy is an issue for future research. 
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Appendix 
Table 1: Variable List and Definitions - Employee Questionnaire 
Variable  Definition 
Individual Characteristics 
Female Female: 0-1 dummy 
Ethnicity Ethnic minority: Black, Indian, Pakistani, Bangladeshi, Chinese: 0-1 dummy  
Single Current marital status: 0-1 dummy 
Disabled Long standing health problems or disabilities which limit work, home or leisure time: 0-1 dummy 
Academic Qualifications 
Low CSE GCSE (grades D-G): 0-1 dummy 
High CSE GCSE (grades A-C): 0-1 dummy 
A-Level A level or equivalent: 0-1 dummy 
Degree Undergraduate Degree or equivalent: 0-1 dummy 
Postgraduate Postgraduate degree or equivalent: 0-1 dummy 
Vocational Recognised vocational qualifications (i.e. trade apprenticeship): 0-1 dummy 
Job Characteristics  
LnWage Log Average Gross Weekly Wages 
Lower Log of lower bound of each of 12 wage bands, (14 bands in 2004)  
Upper  Log of upper bound of each of 12 wage bands, (14 bands in 2004) 
Tenure Years of work  at this workplace (mid-points of 5 bands) 
Tenure-Sq/100 Tenure squared divided by 100 
Fixed-Term Employed on a fixed term contract: 0-1 dummy 
Temporary Employed on a temporary contract: 0-1 dummy 
Union Member  Employee is a trade union member: 0-1 dummy 
Occupational Categories 
Technical Associate professional and technical: 0-1 dummy 
Clerical Clerical and secretarial (typist, postal clerk, secretary): 0-1 dummy 
Crafts Craft and skilled service (tool maker, electrician, fitter): 0-1 dummy 
Services Personal and protective service (police officer, bar staff): 0-1 dummy 
Sales Sales (till operator, sales assistant): 0-1 dummy 
Operatives Operative and assembly (assembly line worker, packer, truck driver): 0-1 dummy 
Training Dummies  
Training Days Numbers of days training received in past 12 months: 
Training Days (TD = 0)  No days: 0-1 dummy 
Training Days (0 ≤ TD < 1) Less than 1 day: 0-1 dummy 
Training Days (1 ≤ TD < 2) 1 to less than 2 days: 0-1 dummy 
Training Days (2 ≤ TD < 5) 2 to less then 5 days: 0-1 dummy 
Training Days (5 ≤ TD < 10) 5 to less than 10 days: 0-1 dummy 
Training Days (TD ≥ 10) 10 days or more: 0-1 dummy 
 
27 
 
Table 2: Variable List and Definitions - Management Questionnaire 
Variable  Definition 
Establishment Characteristics 
Monitoring Percentage of non-managerial employees who are supervisors 
% Absence Percentage workdays lost through employee sickness or absence in last 12 months 
% Disabled  Percentage of employees who are disabled 
% Dismissed  Percentage of permanent employees dismissed the last 12 months (full and part time) 
% Entrants Percentage of new employees (new entrants) 
% Non-White Percentage of employees from non-white ethnic background 
% Part-Time  Percentage of employees who are part-time  
% Quits Percentage of employees voluntarily quit last the 12 months 
% Redundant  Percentage of permanent employees made redundant the last 12 months (full and part time) 
% Retired Percentage of employees retired in the last 12 months 
% Trade Union  Percentage of employees who are trade union members 
Ln Size Log of the total number of employees at the establishment 
Missing Absence Missing information on absence rate: 0-1 dummy  
Human Resources  
Equal Opportunities Formal written policy on equal opportunities or managing diversity: 0-1 dummy 
New Technology Introduction of new technology over the last 5 years: 0-1 dummy 
Organisational Change Changes in the organization of work over the last 5 years: 0-1 dummy 
Long-Term Employment Strongly agree / agree that employees led to expect long-term employment in this organization: 0-1 dummy 
Organizational Values Strongly agree / agree that employees are fully committed to values of the organization: 0-1 dummy  
Non-Specified Help Strongly agree / agree that employees asked to help in ways not specified in their job: 0-1 dummy  
Manager Time Manager spends a major part of his time on employee relations matters: 0-1 dummy  
Freelance People presently working for this establishment on a freelance basis: 0-1 dummy 
Productivity Targets Productivity targets are set at the establishment: 0-1 dummy  
Absenteeism Targets Absenteeism targets are set at the establishment: 0-1 dummy: 0-1 dummy  
Job-Sharing Entitlement Non-managerial employees are entitled to job sharing schemes: 0-1 dummy 
Part-Time Entitlement Non-managerial employees are entitled to switch from full-time to part-time employment: 0-1 dummy  
Term-Time Entitlement Non-managerial employees are entitled to term-time only contracts: 0-1 dummy 
Home-Work Entitlement Non-managerial employees are entitled to work at or from home in normal working hours: 0-1 dummy 
Flexitime If the establishment has flexitime for any non-managerial employees: 0-1 dummy 
Zero-Hour Contracts If the establishment has zero-hour contracts for any non-managerial employees: 0-1 dummy 
Annualised Hours  If the establishment has annualized hours for any non-managerial employees: 0-1 dummy 
Shift-Working If the establishment has shift working for any non-managerial employees: 0-1 dummy 
Short-Term Cover Establishment is using temporary agency employees for short-term cover for absence/vacancies: 0-1 dummy  
Long-Term Unemployed Special procedure to encourage applications from people unemployed for 12 months or more: 0-1 dummy  
Motivation Motivation is important when recruiting new employees: 0-1 dummy 
Joint Consultative Committee Joint consultative committee: 0-1 dummy 
Supervisory Authority Supervisors have authority to dismiss employees for unsatisfactory performance: 0-1 dummy 
References References are important when recruiting new employees: 0-1 dummy 
Personality & Aptitude Firms conduct pre-screening personality and/or aptitude tests: 0-1 dummy  
Industry Classification 
Construction Construction: 0-1 dummy 
Education Education: 0-1 dummy 
Financial Financial services: 0-1 dummy 
Health Health: 0-1 dummy 
Hotels and Restaurants Hotels and restaurants: 0-1 dummy 
Manufacturing Manufacturing: 0-1 dummy  
Other Businesses Other businesses: 0-1 dummy 
Public Administration Public administration: 0-1 dummy 
Transportation Transportation: 0-1 dummy 
Utilities Electricity, water, gas: 0-1 dummy 
Wholesale and Retail Wholesale and retail: 0-1 dummy 
Regional Dummies 10 regional dummies (Standard Statistical Region) 
Teamwork   
Teamwork 1 Some (20-39%) employees work in formally designated teams: 0-1 dummy 
Teamwork 2 Just a few (1-39%) employees work in formally designated teams: 0-1 dummy 
Teamwork 3 None (0%) employees work in formally designated teams: 0-1 dummy 
Workplace Relations   
Workplace Relations 1 Good management-employee relationship: 0-1 dummy 
Workplace Relations 2 Neither good nor bad management-employee relationship: 0-1 dummy 
Workplace Relations 3 Poor management-employee relationship: 0-1 dummy  
Workplace Relations 4 Very poor management-employee relationship: 0-1 dummy 
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Table 2: Variable List and Definitions - Management Questionnaire (Continued) 
Variable  Definition 
Training   
Percentage Employees Trained Percentage of employees who received formal ‘off-the-job’ training over past 12 months 
Training% 1 Almost all (80-99%):  0-1 dummy 
Training% 2 Most (60-79%): 0-1 dummy  
Training% 3 Around half (40-59%): 0-1 dummy 
Training% 4 Some (20-39%): 0-1 dummy 
Training% 5 Just a few (1-19%): 0-1 dummy 
Training% 6 None (0%): 0-1 dummy 
Average Training in Days Average number of days employees spent in formal off-the-job training over past 12 months 
Training Days 1 No training: 0-1 dummy 
Training Days 2 Less than 1 day: 0-1 dummy 
Training Days 3 1 to less than 2 days: 0-1 dummy 
Ownership  
Ownership Control 1 Establishment is UK owned / controlled: 0-1 dummy 
Ownership Control 2 Establishment is predominantly UK owned (51% of ownership or more): 0-1 dummy 
Ownership Control 3 Establishment is UK and foreign owned: 0-1 dummy 
Ownership Control 4 Establishment is predominantly foreign owned (51% of ownership or more): 0-1 dummy 
Single Establishment Establishment does not belong to another body: 0-1 dummy 
Owns/Control Subsidiaries Organization owns or controls subsidiary companies or establishments outside the UK: 0-1 dummy 
Proprietor / Owner Proprietor / owner/Managing director/Partner of the establishment;: 0-1 dummy 
Production & Supply  
Local market  Establishment supplies goods to the local market: 0-1 dummy  
Regional market  Establishment supplies goods to the regional market: 0-1 dummy  
National market  Establishment provides goods to the national market: 0-1 dummy  
Downstream firm Establishment supplies goods to consumers: 0-1 dummy 
Upstream firm Establishment supplies goods to other companies: 0-1 dummy 
Internal firm Establishment supplies goods to other parts of organization to which it belongs: 0-1 dummy 
Non-Open Market Establishment does not supply goods for sale in the open market : 0-1 dummy  
High competition Degree of competition is high / very high: 0-1 dummy 
Just-In-Time System designed to minimize inventories, supplies or work in progress: 0-1 dummy 
Different goods Establishment produces different products or services: 0-1 dummy  
Wage Bargaining  
Wage Bargain 1 Collective bargaining for more than one employer (e.g. industry-wide agreement) : 0-1 dummy  
Wage Bargain 2 Collective bargaining at an organization level: 0-1 dummy 
Wage Bargain 3  Collective bargaining at this workplace: 0-1 dummy 
Wage Bargain 4 Pay set by management at a higher level in this organization: 0-1 dummy 
Wage Bargain 5 Pay set by management at this workplace: 0-1 dummy 
Wage Bargain 6 Pay determined by negotiation with individual employees: 0-1 dummy 
Wage Bargain 7 Pay determined in some other way (e.g. pay review body) : 0-1 dummy 
Wage Bargain 8 Pay determined by none of these methods: 0-1 dummy 
Other  
Old establishment Establishment operating at current or previous address for more than 5 years: 0-1 dummy  
Pension scheme Employees entitled to an employer pension scheme: 0-1 dummy 
Monitoring  
Monitoring % of non-managerial employees have job duties that involve supervising other employees?  
Monitoring 0 0% (‘None’) : 0-1 dummy 
Monitoring 1 1%– 19% (‘Just a few’) : 0-1 dummy 
Monitoring 2 20% – 39% (‘Some’) : 0-1 dummy 
Monitoring 3  40% – 59% (‘Around half’) : 0-1 dummy  
Monitoring 4 60% – 79% (‘Most’) : 0-1 dummy 
Monitoring 5  80% - 99% (‘Almost all’) : 0-1 dummy 
Monitoring 6 100% (‘All’) : 0-1 dummy 
Workforce  
% Young Percentage of workforce that are ‘young’ (less than 20 years old) 
% Old Percentage of workforce that are ‘old’ (more than 51 years old) 
% Part-Time  Percentage of workforce employed on part-time contracts 
Trade Union Density Percentage of workforce that are covered by a trade union agreement 
% Technical Staff Percentage of workforce that are employed as technical staff 
% Clerical Percentage of workforce that are employed as clerical staff 
% Craft Percentage of workforce that are employed as craft staff 
% Serpc Percentage of workforce that are employed as protective and personal service staff  
% Operative Percentage of workforce that are employed as operative and assembly staff 
% Sales Percentage of workforce that are employed as sales staff 
% Routine / Unskilled Percentage of workforce that are employed as routine / unskilled staff 
Unemployment-Vacancy  Unemployment-vacancy rate by travel-to-work area 
Number of Employees Number of Employees 
Notes: 
1. Goods refers to goods and / or services throughout; 
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Table 3: Descriptive Statistics: Establishment Characteristics1 
 1998 2004 
 Mean Std Error Mean Std Error 
Industry     
Manufacturing 0.169 .0035 0.122 0.003 
Utilities 0.003 0.000 0.001 0.000 
Construction 0.049 0.003 0.037 0.002 
Wholesale & Retail 0.203 0.003 0.200 0.002 
Hotel & Restaurants 0.067 0.002 0.057 0.001 
Transportation 0.055 0.002 0.052 0.001 
Financial 0.047 0.001 0.053 0.001 
Other Businesses 0.100 0.002 0.141 0.003 
Public Administration 0.055 0.002 0.038 0.001 
Education 0.077 0.001 0.067 0.001 
Health 0.134 0.001 0.161 0.002 
Region     
East Anglia 0.054 0.004 0.039 0.003 
East Midlands 0.074 0.004 0.141 0.005 
London 0.082 0.004 0.068 0.004 
North East 0.053 0.003 0.101 0.004 
North West 0.109 0.005 0.112 0.004 
Scotland 0.094 0.004 0.085 0.004 
South East 0.196 0.006 0.122 0.005 
South West 0.101 0.005 0.087 0.004 
Wales 0.035 0.002 0.110 0.004 
West Midlands 0.115 0.006 0.039 0.003 
Workforce      
Percentage Young 0.080 0.002 0.083 0.002 
Percentage Old 0.155 0.002 0.219 0.003 
Percentage Part-Time  0.309 0.005 0.324 0.004 
Trade Union Density 0.240 0.004 0.191 0.003 
% Technical Staff 0.055 0.002 0.083 0.002 
% Clerical 0.172 0.003 0.168 0.003 
% Craft 0.120 0.003 0.079 0.003 
% Serpc 0.097 0.003 0.099 0.003 
% Operative 0.099 0.003 0.090 0.003 
% Sales 0.146 0.004 0.166 0.004 
% Routine / Unskilled 0.124 0.003 0.110 0.002 
Unemployment-Vacancy  3.615 0.022 3.339 0.031 
Number of Employees 62.605 0.533 49.504 0.341 
Number of Observations 19653 16773 
Notes: 
1. Estimates are weighted. 
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Table 4: Descriptive Statistics – Individual Questionnaire 
 1998 2004 
 Mean Std. Error Mean Std. Error 
Education     
Low CSE 0.146 0.004 0.113 0.003 
High CSE 0.299 0.005 0.279 0.005 
A-Level 0.148 0.004 0.145 0.004 
Degree 0.074 0.003 0.139 0.004 
Postgraduate 0.011 0.001 0.032 0.002 
Vocational 0.368 0.006 0.560 0.006 
Occupation     
Technical 0.107 0.005 0.194 0.006 
Clerical 0.197 0.007 0.228 0.007 
Crafts 0.130 0.006 0.100 0.006 
Services 0.103 0.007 0.092 0.004 
Sales 0.121 0.008 0.119 0.007 
Operatives 0.166 0.010 0.112 0.006 
Demographic     
Fixed-Term 0.027 0.002 0.027 0.002 
Temporary 0.048 0.003 0.053 0.003 
Minority 0.027 0.002 0.064 0.004 
Female 0.519 0.011 0.528 0.008 
Trade Union Member 0.389 0.012 0.314 0.009 
Marries 0.674 0.006 0.647 0.005 
Long-Term Illness 0.065 0.003 0.117 0.003 
Training     
Training Days (TD = 0)      
Training Days (0 ≤ TD < 1) 0.103 0.003 0.104 0.003 
Training Days (1 ≤ TD < 2) 0.127 0.003 0.141 0.004 
Training Days (2 ≤ TD < 5) 0.161 0.004 0.192 0.005 
Training Days (5 ≤ TD < 10) 0.075 0.003 0.080 0.003 
Training Days (TD ≥ 10) 0.081 0.004 0.076 0.003 
Number of Observations 19653 16773 
Notes: 
1. Estimates are weighted. 
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Table 5: Instrumenting Equation (Ordered Probit) 
Dependent Variable: Monitoring 
 1998 2004 
 Coefficient T-Stat Coefficient T-Stat 
Proprietor / Owner 0.136 0.91 -0.295 -2.12 
Equal Opportunities 0.105 0.81 0.179 1.59 
% Absence 0.009 1.57 0.002 0.30 
Missing Absence 0.110 0.83 -0.056 -0.53 
New Technology -0.076 -0.69 -0.009 -0.11 
Organizational Change 0.215 2.13 -0.029 -0.34 
Workplace Relations 2 -0.034 -0.31 -0.051 -0.61 
Workplace Relations 3 -0.051 -0.27 0.102 0.44 
Workplace Relations 4 0.868 3.50 -0.520 -1.27 
Workplace Relations 5 -2.803 -4.59 -0.391 -0.92 
Long-Term Employment -0.028 -0.22 0.026 0.27 
Organizational Values 0.086 0.77 0.158 1.58 
Non-Specified Help 0.130 1.34 -0.079 -1.01 
Manager Time -0.047 -0.37 -0.078 -0.84 
Downstream Firm 0.149 0.62 0.042 0.42 
Upstream Firm 0.254 0.98 -0.055 -0.46 
Internal Firm 0.734 2.87 -0.158 -0.86 
Non-Open Market 0.121 0.47 -0.921 -2.61 
Freelance -0.047 -0.33 0.114 0.71 
Owns/Controls Subsidiaries 0.026 0.19 0.151 1.35 
Just-In-Time -0.007 -0.07 0.166 1.63 
Different Goods 0.020 0.18 -0.070 -0.83 
Productivity Targets -0.166 -1.64 -0.135 -1.50 
Absenteeism Targets 0.191 1.70 -0.094 -0.95 
Job Sharing 0.059 0.46 0.068 0.78 
Part-Time Entitlement -0.106 -0.86 -0.151 -1.53 
Term-Time Entitlement 0.460 3.35 0.165 1.81 
Home-Work Entitlement -0.106 -0.70 0.339 3.08 
Flextime -0.194 -1.52 -0.134 -1.56 
Zero-Hours Contracts -0.240 -0.99 0.104 0.65 
Annualized Hours 0.139 0.88 0.355 3.06 
Shift-Working 0.005 0.06 0.118 1.32 
Short Term Cover 0.169 1.32 0.207 1.94 
Long-Term Unemployed -0.139 -0.72 -0.085 -0.37 
Motivation 0.380 2.37 -0.076 -0.70 
Joint Consultative Committee 0.334 3.16 0.233 2.71 
% Entrants 0.327 1.64 0.054 0.21 
% Dismissed -1.454 -0.94 0.740 0.88 
% Redundant -0.523 -2.02 -1.404 -2.42 
% Resigned -0.003 -0.01 0.047 0.14 
% Retired -0.403 -1.14 0.125 0.36 
% Disabled 3.671 2.07 0.173 0.22 
Supervisory Authority 0.727 3.49 0.620 6.24 
References 0.009 0.08 -0.004 -0.04 
Cut Points     
Cut 1 -0.086 -0.259 -0.591 2.997 
Cut 2 1.324 3.992 0.594 3.000 
Cut 3 2.148 6.332 1.403 6.992 
Cut 4 2.574 7.736 1.859 9.060 
Cut 5 2.866 8.528 2.214 10.397 
Cut 6 3.055 8.938 2.591 10.560 
Number of Observations 2181 2280 
Wald Chi-Squared 146.02 44 152.12 44 
Log Pseudo Likelihood -2953.4664 -3130.3389 
Pseudo R-Squared 0.0583 0.0409 
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Table 5: Instrumenting Equation (Ordered Probit) - Continued 
Dependent Variable: Monitoring 
Notes: 
1. Estimates are weighted and standard errors are adjusted for workplace clustering.  
2. The omitted categories are: being neither a proprietor/owner/managing director/partner, no introduction of new 
technology over the last 5 years, relationship between management and employees is very good, managers neither 
agree nor disagree/disagree/strongly disagree that employees are led to expect long term employment in this 
organization, managers neither agree nor disagree/disagree/strongly disagree that employees are fully committed to 
the values of this organization, managers neither agree nor disagree/disagree/strongly disagree that frequently ask 
employees at the workplace to help managers in ways not specified in their job, there is no manager or director at a 
higher level and at a separate establishment who spends a major parts of his/her time on personnel or employee 
relations matters, administrative office only, no people presently working for this establishment on a freelance basis, 
does not own or control subsidiary companies or establishments outside the UK, no system designed to minimize 
inventories/supplies or work in progress, output of the establishment concentrates on one product or service, no 
productivity targets, no absenteeism targets, no job sharing schemes for non-managerial employees, no switching from 
full to part time employment for non-managerial employees, no term-time only contracts for non-managerial 
employees, no working at or from home for non-managerial employees, no flextime for non-managerial employees, 
no zero-hour contracts for non-managerial employees, no annualized hours for non-managerial employees, no shift-
work for non-managerial employees, no short term cover for staff absence/vacancies, no special procedures to 
encourage applications from people who have been unemployed for 12 months or more, motivation is not important 
when recruiting new employees, no joint consultative committee, supervisors do not have the authority to dismiss 
workers for unsatisfactory performance, reference letters are not important when recruiting new employees.       
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Table 6: Interval Regression 
Dependent Variable: Log Wage 
 1998 2004 
 Coefficient T-Stat Coefficient T-Stat 
Individual Characteristics     
Tenure 0.049 6.55 0.029 4.43 
Tenure-Squared/100 -0.172 -4.48 -0.106 -2.67 
Fitted Monitoring 0.047 1.50 0.038 1.14 
Fitted Monitoring*Tenure -0.008 -2.03 -0.010 -2.62 
Education     
Low CSE -0.015 -0.68 0.044 1.61 
High CSE 0.039 1.76 0.054 2.49 
A Level 0.069 2.45 0.092 3.28 
Degree 0.158 5.03 0.195 6.41 
Postgraduate  0.162 2.81 0.288 5.60 
Vocational 0.067 3.92 0.097 5.61 
Occupation     
Technical 0.380 10.69 0.507 11.63 
Clerical 0.238 6.31 0.364 10.37 
Craft 0.315 6.57 0.326 7.90 
Services 0.158 3.89 0.377 8.76 
Sales 0.229 4.61 0.305 6.58 
Operative 0.096 2.79 0.211 4.86 
Demographics     
Fixed-Term Employee -0.201 -4.17 0.015 0.36 
Temporary Employee -0.279 -5.78 -0.287 -6.63 
Non-White -0.115 -2.27 -0.058 -1.85 
Female -0.272 -9.63 -0.275 -12.96 
Trade Union Member 0.161 6.66 0.172 7.03 
Married 0.110 6.71 0.059 3.39 
Long Term Disability -0.080 -2.28 0.007 0.29 
Training     
Training Days (0 ≤ TD < 1) 0.017 0.66 -0.016 -0.57 
Training Days (1 ≤ TD < 2) 0.070 3.46 0.099 3.83 
Training Days (2 ≤ TD < 5) 0.149 5.91 0.144 6.42 
Training Days (5 ≤ TD < 10) 0.182 6.79 0.190 5.74 
Training Days (TD ≥ 10) 0.108 2.88 0.085 2.37 
Firm Characteristics     
Log Size 0.035 4.10 0.036 3.81 
% Young -0.292 -3.13 -0.191 -2.36 
% Old -0.286 -2.83 -0.037 -0.59 
% Part-Time  -1.012 -16.19 -0.970 -17.15 
% Trade Union  0.048 1.41 -0.135 -3.76 
% Technical  -0.251 -3.25 -0.137 -1.88 
% Clerical  -0.069 -0.76 -0.041 -0.55 
% Craft  -0.192 -2.21 -0.123 -1.81 
% Services  -0.229 -2.72 -0.305 -4.21 
% Operatives  -0.132 -1.50 -0.134 -1.79 
% Sales  -0.305 -3.00 -0.202 -2.45 
% Other  -0.163 -1.90 -0.059 -0.76 
Other Controls     
Unemployment-Vacancy % -0.028 -3.67 -0.001 -0.23 
Constant 4.980 48.20 5.075 60.59 
Industry Controls Yes Yes 
Regional Controls Yes Yes 
Number of Observations 19653 16773 
Wald Chi-Squared 5908.10 62 4327.00 62 
Log Pseudo Likelihood -1334.1321 -1056.3854 
Notes: 
1. Estimates are weighted and standard errors are adjusted for workplace clustering.  
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Table 7: Ln Wage and Monitoring (Cross Tabulations) 
 1998 2004 
 Mean Std. Error Mean Std. Error 
Monitoring 0 5.002 0.879 5.581 0.861 
Monitoring 1 4.908 0.814 5.539 0.838 
Monitoring 2 4.990 0.806 5.704 0.827 
Monitoring 3  5.057 0.765 5.699 0.936 
Monitoring 4 5.000 0.850 5.769 0.913 
Monitoring 5  5.140 0.771 5.736 0.703 
Monitoring 6 4.921 0.826 5.533 0.692 
Note. Means are weighted. 
 
 
 
Table 8: Interval Regression 
Dependent Variable: Log Wage 
 1998 2004 
 Coefficient T-Stat Coefficient T-Stat 
Individual Characteristics     
Tenure 0.041 7.21 0.028 4.61 
Tenure-Squared -0.169 -4.98 -0.111 -3.02 
Monitoring 1 -0.071 -2.43 -0.033 -1.35 
Monitoring 2 -0.094 -3.10 -0.044 -1.63 
Monitoring 3 -0.049 -1.22 -0.071 -2.08 
Monitoring 4 -0.063 -1.49 0.016 0.36 
Monitoring 5 0.045 1.08 0.033 0.74 
Monitoring 6 -0.076 -1.64 -0.091 -1.22 
Constant 5.059 66.78 5.098 70.24 
LnSigma -0.816 -53.49 -0.631 -36.96 
Sigma 0.442 65.55 0.532 58.54 
Number of Observations 19653 16673 
Wald Chi-Squared 7398.03 66 6359.50 66 
Log Pseudo Likelihood -1333.1036 -1056.3887 
Notes: 
1. Both the 1998 and 2004 specifications include all the other regressors as per Table 6. 
2. Estimates are weighted and standard errors are adjusted for workplace clustering.  
3. The omitted “Monitoring” dummy variable is “No Monitoring”.  
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Table 9: Robustness Checks - 1998 
Dependent Variable: Log Wage (Interval Regressions)  
 (1) 
Age 
(2) 
Dep. Children 
(3) 
Log of Working 
Hours 
(4) 
Teamwork 
(5) 
PRP 
(6) 
Training 
(7) 
Bargaining 
(8) 
Productivty 
(9) 
Pension 
Scheme 
(10) 
Personality & 
Attitude Tests 
(11) 
Manag. & 
Profes. 
 Coef. T-Stat. Coef. T-Stat. Coef. T-Stat. Coef. T-Stat. Coef. T-Stat. Coef. T-Stat Coef. T-Stat Coef. T-Stat. Coef. T-Stat. Coef. T-Stat. Coef. T-Stat. 
Fitted Monitoring 0.038 1.29 0.038 1.31 0.042 1.46 0.048 1.65 0.043 1.53 0.042 1.48 0.045 1.61 0.048 1.71 0.046 1.65 0.044 1.58 0.051 2.01 
Interaction -0.007 -1.84 -0.007 -1.93 -0.007 -2.02 -0.008 -2.22 -0.007 -2.10 -0.007 -2.16 -0.007 -2.20 -0.008 -2.29 -0.008 -2.28 -0.008 -2.29 -0.005 -1.79 
  
Robustness Checks1  
Age Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No 
Dependent Children No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No 
Log of working hours No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No 
Teamwork No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No 
PRP No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No 
Training No No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No 
Bargaining No No No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes No 
Productivity No No No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes No 
Pension scheme No No No No No No No No Yes Yes No 
Persn. & attitude test No No No No No No No No No Yes No 
Manag. & Profes. No No No No No No No No No Yes Yes 
Nos of Observations 19653 19653 19653 19653 19653 19653 19653 19653 19653 19653 27434 
Nos of Groups 1749 1749 1749 1749 1749 1749 1749 1749 1749 1749 1761 
Logseudolikelihood  -1309.13 -1307.12 -1300.15 -1298.27 -1297.31 -1296.93 -1295.67 -1294.56 -1294.01 -1293.72 -1908.13 
Wald Chi-Square 6464.47 68 6460.11 69 6480.89 70 6775.08 76 7725.45 81 7354.13 87 7955.19 93 8840.37 98 9078.71 99 9078.71 100 7734.04 64 
Notes: 
1. All specifications include the regressors as per Table 6. Estimates are weighted and standard errors are adjusted for clustering. 
2. Robustness with respect to age, teamwork, performance related pay and bargaining is checked by incorporating the following zero-one dummy variables into our standard (i.e. Table 6) interval regression: (i) Age (Age1 - Age5); (ii) 
Dependent children (0/1 dummy);  (iii) Log of working weekly hours;  (iv) Teamwork (Teamwork2 – Teamwork7); (v) Performance Related Pay (PRP1- PRP5); (vi) Training; (vii) Wage Bargaining (Wage-Bargain1 – Wage-
Bargain5); (viii) Productivity (Productivity1-Productivity6), (ix) Pension scheme; (x) Personality and attitude tests when filling vacancies.  
3. Robustness with respect to managerial and professional staff (column 11) is checked by including managers and professional employees into our sample and by incorporating the following zero-one dummy variables into our standard 
(i.e. Table 6) interval regressions (Manager, Professional). 
4. Interaction = Fitted Monitoring*Tenure 
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Table 10: Robustness Checks - 2004 
Dependent Variable: Log Wage (Interval Regressions)  
 (1) 
Age 
(2) 
Dep. Children 
(3) 
Log of Working 
Hours 
(4) 
Teamwork 
(5) 
PRP 
(6) 
Training 
(7) 
Bargaining 
(8) 
Productivty 
(9) 
Pension 
Scheme 
(10) 
Personality & 
Attitude Tests 
(11) 
Manag. & 
Profes. 
 Coef. T-Stat. Coef. T-Stat. Coef. T-Stat. Coef. T-Stat. Coef. T-Stat. Coef. T-Stat Coef. T-Stat Coef. T-Stat. Coef. T-Stat. Coef. T-Stat. Coef. T-Stat. 
Fitted Monitoring 0.028 0.86 0.028 0.87 0.035 1.15 0.040 1.32 0.035 1.17 0.035 1.18 0.031 1.05 0.024 0.85 0.022 0.75 0.022 0.77 0.009 0.32 
Interaction -0.009 -2.33 -0.010 -2.42 -0.010 -2.67 -0.011 -2.83 -0.011 -2.83 -0.010 -2.76 -0.010 -2.66 -0.009 -2.50 -0.009 -2.49 -0.009 -2.49 -0.009 -2.60 
  
Robustness Checks1  
Age Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No 
Dependent Children No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No 
Log of working hours No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No 
Teamwork No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No 
PRP No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No 
Training No No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No 
Bargaining No No No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes No 
Productivity No No No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes No 
Pension scheme No No No No No No No No Yes Yes No 
Persn. & attitude test No No No No No No No No No Yes No 
Manag. & Profes. No No No No No No No No No Yes Yes 
Nos of Observations 16773 16773 16773 16773 16773 16773 16773 16773 16773 16773 21872 
Nos of Groups 1705 1705 1705 1705 1705 1705 1705 1705 1705 1705 1724 
Logseudolikelihood  -1053.45 -1052.43 -1036.97 -1036.16 -1035.93 -1035.24 -1034.92 -1034.07 -1033.88 -1033.86 -1386.45 
Wald Chi-Square 4659.79 68 4680.52 69 5063.67 70 5222.65 76 5382.03 81 5584.20 87 5577.52 93 6025.62 98 6039.90 99 6039.55 100 5593.85 64 
Notes: 
5. All specifications include the regressors as per Table 6. Estimates are weighted and standard errors are adjusted for clustering. 
6. Robustness with respect to age, teamwork, performance related pay and bargaining is checked by incorporating the following zero-one dummy variables into our standard (i.e. Table 6) interval regression: (i) Age (Age1 - Age5); (ii) 
Dependent children (0/1 dummy);  (iii) Log of working weekly hours;  (iv) Teamwork (Teamwork2 – Teamwork7); (v) Performance Related Pay (PRP1- PRP5); (vi) Training; (vii) Wage Bargaining (Wage-Bargain1 – Wage-
Bargain5); (viii) Productivity (Productivity1-Productivity6), (ix) Pension scheme; (x) Personality and attitude tests when filling vacancies.  
7. Robustness with respect to managerial and professional staff (column 11) is checked by including managers and professional employees into our sample and by incorporating the following zero-one dummy variables into our standard 
(i.e. Table 6) interval regressions (Manager, Professional). 
8. Interaction = Fitted Monitoring*Tenure 
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Table 11: Random Effects 
Dependent Variable: Log Wage 
 1998 2004 
 Coefficient T-Stat Coefficient T-Stat 
Fitted Monitoring 0.023 1.37 0.031 1.49 
Fitted Monitoring*Tenure -0.005 -3.58 -0.004 -1.90 
sigma u 0.207  0.198  
sigma e 0.450  0.565  
rho 0.175  0.110  
Number of Observations 19653 16773 
Number of Groups 1749 1705 
Wald chi2(62) 12916.54 7998.46 
R-Square Within 0.209 0.155 
R-Square Between 0.812 0.728 
R-Square Overall 0.586 0.441 
Notes: 
1. Both the 1998 and 2004 specifications include all the other regressors as per Table 6. 
2. Since there is no a random effects interval regression estimator, the dependent variable is the log of weekly 
wages where we take the mid-point of the income bands.    
 
 
Table 12: Fixed Effects 
Dependent Variable: Log Wage 
 1998 2004 
 Coefficient T-Stat Coefficient T-Stat 
Fitted Monitoring --- --- --- --- 
Fitted Monitoring*Tenure -0.014 -3.51 -0.013 -2.92 
sigma u 0.502  0.498  
sigma e 0.489  0.560  
rho 0.513  0.442  
Number of Observations 19653 16773 
Number of Groups 1749 1705 
F-statistic 31.69 31.46 
R-square Within 0.186 0.164 
R-square Between 0.489 0.358 
R-square Overall 0.338 0.239 
Notes: 
1. Both the 1998 and 2004 specifications include all the other regressors as per Table 6. 
2. “---” suggests that firm characteristics drop from the fixed effects regression. 
3. Since there is no a fixed effects interval regression estimator, the dependent variable is the log of weekly wages 
where we take the mid-point of the income bands. 
 
 
Table 13:  
Dependent Variable: Log Wage 
 2004 
 Coefficient T-Stat 
Employee-Recorded Fitted Monitoring 2.611 1.54 
Employee-Recorded Fitted Monitoring*Tenure -0.492 -2.17 
Number of Observations 16225 
Notes: 
1. The Fitted Monitoring variable is an aggregate measure of supervision obtained from the 2004 employee 
questionnaire only. Relevant information is not available in the 1998 survey.       
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Table 14: Wage and Firm Size 
Dependent Variable: Log Wage (Interval Regressions) 
 1998 2004 
 Small Firms Large Firms All Firms Small Firms Large Firms All Firms 
 Coef. T-Stat. Coef. T-Stat. Coef. T-Stat. Coef. T-Stat. Coef. T-Stat. Coef. T-Stat. 
Fitted Monitoring 0.067 1.71 0.009 0.34 0.028 1.06 0.037 0.82 0.079 2.48 0.012 0.38 
Fitted Monitoring*Tenure -0.010 -1.87 -0.002 -0.86 - - -0.016 -2.79 -0.002 -0.64 - - 
Fitted Monitoring*Tenure*Log Firm Size - - - - -0.001 -1.92 - - - - -0.002 -2.20 
Number of Observations 6594 13059 19653 5427 11346 16773 
Number of Groups 675 1074 1749 729 976 1705 
Log Pseudoliklihood  -1046.057 -279.722 -1334.288 -832.344 -221.895 -1056.58 
Wald Chi-Square 4115.23 5497.06 5722.75 2851.61 3909.40 4323.03 
Notes: 
1. All specifications include the regressors as per Table 6. Estimates are weighted and standard errors are adjusted for clustering. 
2. In the 1998 (2004) sample, Small Firms are defined as those with less than 62.6 (49.5) employees, which was the mean size of firms in 1998 (2004), and Large Firms those with 62.6 (49.5) or more employees.. 
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